A/A-BAR MOVEMENT AND ATTRACT-F*

Juan Romero Morales (Universidad de Alcalá de Henares)
Norberto Moreno Quiben (Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha/IUIOG)

1. *Introduction*

Chomsky (1993, 1995) analyzes Movement as a copying process. When an element raises it leaves a copy in its base position. Since overt movement is triggered by morphological properties, syntactic objects are *phonetically* interpreted in the derived position. In the Minimalist program, thematic relations are established configurationally in the base position (see Hale and Keyser 1993 and Chomsky 1995). It follows then that semantic features must be interpreted in the pre-movement configuration. If these assumptions are on the right track, it has to be set where formal features must be interpreted. Chomsky argues that there is a preference principle for reconstruction: "Do it when you can" (Chomsky 1993: 41). This hypothesis is supported by such constructions as (1a-c).

(1) a. *John wondered* [[*which picture of himself*] [*Bill saw t*]]

b. *John wondered* [[*which picture of Tom*] [*he saw t*]]

c. *John wondered* [[*which picture of him*] [*Bill saw t*]]

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In (1b) and (1c), it is not possible a reading in which the complement of *picture*, *Tom* and *him*, respectively, is coreferential with the subject of the embedded clause. This fact can be explained if the preference principle forces reconstruction of the raised constituent. Then, at LF, both *Tom* and *him* will be in the c-commanding domain of the subject of the embedded clause, yielding a violation of condition C and condition B of Binding Theory respectively.

In (1a), however, the anaphor complement of the noun *picture*, *himself*, can be bound by either the subject of the matrix clause or by the subject of the embedded clause. Chomsky (1993: 40-41) relates the apparent violation of the preference principle with the hypothesis that condition-A of Binding Theory is satisfied by cliticization$_{LF}$ of anaphors. Applying cliticization$_{LF}$ to (1a) will derive either (2a) or (2b), depending on whether the antecedent is *John* or *Bill*.

(2) a. *John self-wondered* [[*which picture of* t_{self}] *Bill saw* [*which picture of himself*]]

b. *John wondered* [[*which picture of himself*] *Bill self-saw* [*which picture of* t_{self}]]

Preference principle can not be applied in (2a), since its application "would break the chain (*self*, t_{self}), leaving the reflexive element without a

θ role at LF" (Chomsky 1993:41). Note that for this explanation to go through, cliticization$_{LF}$ must precede reconstruction, otherwise the structure shown in (2a) would not be interpretable at LF.

It has been observed that A-movement and A-bar movement behave differently with respect to Reconstruction effects (see Mahajan 1991 and references cited therein). Only arguments moved to A-bar positions are able to reconstruct (1). Conversely, arguments moved to A-positions do not reconstruct. This is shown in the examples in (3).

(3) a. **I denied his$_i$ paycheck to each worker$_i$*

b. *I denied each worker$_i$ his$_i$ paycheck $t_{each\ worker}$*

c. *I denied each paycheck$_i$ to its$_i$ owner*

d. **I denied its$_i$ owner each paycheck$_i$ $t_{its\ owner}$*

Following Larson's (1988) derivative approach to the Double Object Construction (DOC), in this type of constructions the Goal argument is raised to an A-position within the VP. In this derived position, a quantifier like *each* in (3b) binds a pronoun in its c-commanding domain in such a way that the pronoun can be interpreted as a bound variable. Crucially, the option of the bound variable interpretation for the pronoun is excluded in (3d). This shows that at LF the pronoun is not in the c-commanding domain of the quantifier *each*, and, therefore, the preference

principle for reconstruction has not been applied in instances of A-movement.

This asymmetry between A/A-bar movement does not follow from any principle of grammar. Moreover, it goes against the spirit of the Minimalist program, since it assumes that there are two types of movement subject to different constraints. We are going to propose that this asymmetry can be derived from the properties of the rule Attract-F. Chomsky (1995) argues that movement must be understood as attraction of formal features as formulated in (4) (Chomsky, 1995: 297).

(4) *K attracts F if F is the closest feature that can enter into a checking relation with a sublabel of K.*

The fact that apparently a whole category is moving is due to properties of the morphophonological component to ensure convergence at this level, and need not be stipulated in the formulation of Attract-F. If this is the case, only the feature attracted moves at LF[1]. Our proposal is that the asymmetry between A/A-bar movement can be established out of this property in terms of the following condition:

(5) a. Attracted features cannot be reconstructed.

b. Pied-piped features must be reconstructed.

We will argue that the condition in (5) is all that is needed to explain the existence of different types of movement. In order to obtain this result, we are going to speculate that the features attracted in A-movement and the features attracted in A-bar movement are different. To be precise, our proposal is that formal features are organized under different sublabels: one sublabel includes operator-like features involved in processes like wh-movement, topicalization, etc; the other sublabel includes the features involved in A-movement (categorial features, Case and ϕ-features). Only features dominated by the sublabel that contains the feature attracted are carried along as "free riders", and form a derivative chain. If this is correct, the apparent lack of reconstruction effects in instances of A-movement may be attributed to the fact that the attracted features are precisely those that encode referentiality —possibly D (Chomsky 1995)[2]. That is, the problem is not that arguments subject to A-movement do not reconstruct, but that reconstruction in those cases does not have an effect

[1] Chomsky (1995) claims that not only the attracted formal feature F moves, but that the whole complex of formal features FF[F] moves along as "free riders".

[2] Chomsky (1995: 272) points out that the categiorial feature D should have argument properties in the sense that may serve as a controller or as a binder.

on Binding theory, since features attracted are the “referential” ones, and, by (5a), do not reconstruct.

In this paper, it will be shown that this hypothesis makes the correct predictions concerning Binding Theory without restoring to differences in types of movements. We assume Binding Theory as outlined in Chomsky (1993):

(6) a. If α is an anaphor, interpret it as coreferential with a c-commanding phrase in D (D, the relevant local domain).

b. If α is a pronominal, interpret it as disjoint from every c-commanding phrase in D.

c. If α is an R-expression, interpret it as disjoint from every c-commanding phrase.

In order to give an account of the differences traditionally attributed to the distinction between A and A-bar movement, we will take this distinction to rely on the notion of Extended Binding Domain. Specifically, the proposal is that when an element raises, it extends its binding domain up to its landing position.

In section 2, we will deal with the notion of Extended Domain and how it can give an account of the cases of A-bar movement exemplified in (1) (section 2.1), and the cases of A movement exemplified in (3) (section

2.2). In section 3, it will be shown that the notion of Extended Domain plus the generalization set in (5) offer a straightforward explanation of Backward Binding facts which have not received a satisfactory account in the literature.

2. ***Extended Domains***

Here we assume that the notion of Binding Domain may be defined along the lines of Chomsky 1986's *Complete Functional Complex* (CFC)[3]. Our guiding idea is that a Binding Domain can be extended derivationally. We define Extended Binding Domain in the following way: let $\alpha 1$ be a Binding Domain, and take the chain $<\alpha_2, L>$, where L = {X, {X, YP}}, and $<\alpha_1,K>$ where K = {W,{W, ...}}, the Extended Binding Domain of α is the set of nodes dominated by L and not dominated by K (7).

(7) Extended Domain

[3] See also Reinhart & Reuland (1991).



Given this, the argument ZP will be included in the Extended Domain of α.

2.1 *A-bar movement*

In the examples in (1), Attract-F targets a wh-feature, and raises it to the CP checking domain, an A-bar position. According to condition in (5), every feature not contained in the wh-sublabel must be reconstructed to its base position. Take the case of the anaphor in (1a), repeated here as (8a). After reconstruction has taken place, the resulting structure is the one in (8b), in which only *which* remains in its derived position.

(8) a. *John wonders which picture of himself Bill saw*

b. *John wonders [which] Bill saw [picture of himself]*

In (8b), if *Bill* is the antecedent, no problem arises. Given the notion of Extended Domain, the interpretation in which *John* serves as antecedent is also straightforward. The NP *which picture of himself* has extended its domain up to the CP in the complement position of *wonders*. In this position, the anaphor can be bound in the same way as it gets bound in standard cases like (9)[4].

(9) *Bill saw a picture of himself*

More interesting are examples as (1c), repeated here as (10a), with LF structure (10b) after applying reconstruction.

(10) a. *John wondered which picture of him Bill saw*

b. *John wondered [which] Bill saw [picture of him]*

In Chomsky (1993), the fact that only *John* may corefer with the pronoun is explained by the preference principle for reconstruction. In the

[4] Note that these cases pose a problem for the cliticization$_{LF}$ approach, since there is no plausible feature in V that can be made responsible for the attraction of the anaphor. When the anaphor occupies an argument position (V complement), *self* can be raised as a free rider with Case features. However, this option is not available when the anaphor is in a Complex NP because it is not an argument of the verb. Since examples as (9) involve "weak" Complex NPs, a possible solution would be to assume that the head of the NP reanalyzes with the verb, allowing anaphor cliticization$_{LF}$ to the relevant

reconstructed structure, *John* is far enough from *him* to be coreferential. The problem for Chomsky's approach is that it is not entirely clear that *Bill* is not also far enough to corefer with the pronoun. Note that in sentences like in (11) the pronoun may be taken as coreferential with the subject (Lasnik & Uriagereka 1988; Reinhart and Reuland 1991)[5].

(11) a. *John$_i$ saw pictures of him$_i$*

b. *Lucie$_i$ saw a picture of her$_i$ in the paper*

Under Chomsky's hypothesis the reconstructed structure for (10a), is quite similar to the LF structure of sentences in (11). Therefore, the prediction is that the interpretation in which *Bill* and *him* corefer in (10a) should be grammatical, which is not the case.

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checking domain (see section 3.1 regarding the differences between "weak" and "strong" NPs).

[5] Spanish patterns with English in the binding properties of the examples examined so far. Data in (11) show a clear contrast in Spanish when using the possessive adjective form. In (i), the possessive *suya* (*of hers*) within the wh-phrase *in situ* can be coreferential with the subject. However, in (ii), the subject of the embedded clause, *Lucía*, can not be taken as antecedent of the possessive after raising of the wh-phrase.

(i) En qué exposición había visto Lucía$_i$ qué foto suya$_i$?
"In which exhibition had Lucía seen which picture of hers?"
(ii) *Juan se preguntaba qué foto suya$_i$ había visto Lucía$_i$?
"Juan wondered which picture of hers Lucía had seen"

It must be noted that the pronoun in phrases like *fotos de él* (*pictures of him*) only markedly has other interpretation than that of *Theme*. On the other hand, the possessive adjective *suya* in (i)-(ii) has a preferred reading with *Agent-Possessor* interpretation. Here we assume the data presented so far as they stand (see Moreno-Quibén and Romero 1997 for further discussion).

On the other hand, in the Extended Binding Domain hypothesis this problem does not arise. As shown in (12), *Bill* is within the Extended Binding Domain of the NP *which pictures of him*, and, in consequence, if *Bill* and *him* are not disjoint in reference, a Condition-B violation occurs.

(12) *John wondered which picture of him Bill saw*



2.2 *A-Movement*

Traditionally it has been stipulated that instances of A-movement do not trigger reconstruction effects. However, under our proposal (5), reconstruction always takes place, except for the attracted features themselves. This proposal raises two questions. In the first place, we have to deal with cases in which the attracted features are those that encode the referential properties of the argument (13). In the second place, an account must be given for cases in which the element that enters into a

Binding relation is within the argument whose features have been attracted (14).

(13) a. *I showed [the woman$_i$] herself$_i$ t$_{Mary}$*

b. **I showed herself$_i$ [the woman$_i$] t$_{herself}$*

(14) a. *I denied each worker$_i$ his$_i$ paycheck t$_{each\ worker}$*

b. **I denied its$_i$ owner each paycheck$_i$ t$_{its\ owner}$*

For the first type of cases, exemplified in (13), we propose that the lack of reconstruction effects *with respect to Binding Theory* is due to the fact that the attracted features are those that encode referentiality, namely D. In (13a), "referential" features are raised with Case feature. According to condition (5a), these features are not reconstructed to their base position and, therefore, they may bind the anaphor. In the same vein, we assume in (13b) that anaphoric features, *self*, are carried along with Case feature. Since these features can not be reconstructed, the anaphor can not be bound by *the woman* and the derivation crashes at LF.

The non-existence of reconstruction effects in (14a) can be explained along the same lines as the preceding cases. The "referential" features of *each worker* raise to a position where they c-command the pronoun. Therefore, *his* may be interpreted as a bound variable. In the example (14b), the notion of Extended Binding Domain will be relevant again. The

pronoun, in this case, is reconstructed to its base position, only the referential features, $R_{\text{its owner}}$, remain in the derived position (15).

(15) *I denied $R_{its\ owner}$ each paycheck its owner*

In the LF-reconstructed structure of (15), the quantifier, *each*, c-commands the pronoun, *its*. However the interpretation of bound variable for the pronoun is not available, since the quantifier is within the extended binding domain of *its owner*, and this interpretation will lead to a condition-B violation. This is shown in more detail in (16).

(16) **I denied its owner each paycheck t*



2.3 *Conclusion*

In this section, we have argued that the condition (5), in conjunction with the notion of Extended Binding Domain, can give a satisfactory

account of certain cases of Binding. In our analysis, it is no longer necessary to stipulate that only A-bar movement feeds reconstruction. This hypothesis provides a unified treatment of movement under minimalist assumptions. The apparent difference in types of movement can be made to follow from the nature of features attracted. Attract-F, unlike Move-α, allows to discriminate between features involved in each particular instance of movement. A richer articulation of the internal architecture of Lexical Items (LIs) may render differences between types of movement trivial. In this section, we have proposed that features are grouped under, at least, two sublabels. The wh-sublabel groups features involved in operator-like movement. The referential-sublabel includes such features as Case, ϕ-features and D, which is held to be responsible for establishing Binding Relations. The condition (5) determines that only the sublabel containing the feature attracted must remain in the derived position. The remaining formal features of LI must be reconstructed. Likewise, we have shown that reconstruction effects regarding Binding Theory in instances of A-bar movement, as well as non-reconstruction effects in A-movement, may be derived from the notion Extended Binding Domain.

3. *Backward Binding*

Pesetsky's (1994) analysis of Backward Binding facts in DOC is based upon Belleti and Rizzi's (1988) insight that anaphor binding must be done at D-Structure. Pesetsky, contra Larson (1988), argues that ditransitive sentences like (17) are derived forms, while DOCs (18) are base generated. It follows then that, under current minimalist assumptions on Binding Theory, reconstruction of the anaphor *each other* to its base position is required in order to satisfy Condition-A.

(17) a. *I showed each other's friends to Paul and Mary*

b. *I showed Paul and Mary to each other's friends*

(18) a. **I showed each other's friends Paul and Mary*

b. *I showed Paul and Mary each other's friends*

In this section we are going to argue that in theses cases the anaphor is bound within the NP that contains it. Likewise, we will claim that a class of logophors must be interpreted this way: those that appear within "strong" NPs[6]. Under this view, Backward Binding effects like the one

[6] There are cases of logophoricity that can not be analyzed along these lines (examples are taken from Reinhart and Reuland (1991); see also Reinhart and Reuland (1993)).

(i) This paper was written by myself
(ii) Apart from myself only three members protested
(iii) Physicists like yourself are a godsend

exemplified in (17a) must be interpreted as instances of accidental coreference. In (17a), the option of coreference is open, since there is no c-command relation between *Paul and Mary* and the antecedent of the anaphor within the NP[7].

In section 3.1, we will examine cases of anaphors bound within NPs. In section 3.2, we will analyze cases like (18a) in which Backward Binding is not possible. In the two sections we will indifferentely use examples drawn from English and Spanish.

3.1 *NP anaphors*

In this section we will present a brief outline of Binding properties of anaphors acting as arguments of NPs. What follows just intends to serve as a framework to deal with Backward Binding effects that will be analyzed in the next section.

Chomsky (1986:167) suggests that certain Binding effects between a pronoun within an NP and an antecedent external to it involve the optional presence of PRO inside the NP.

(19) a. **They$_i$ told* [*PRO$_i$ stories about them$_i$*]

Note that these examples involve 1st and 2nd person anaphors. This property could be relevant for the availability of these logophors.

b. *They$_i$ heard* [*PRO$_j$ stories about them$_i$*]

Under this view, disjoint reference in (19a) is obtained with or without PRO. In both cases, the pronoun must be free in the domain D set by the presence of a subject (either PRO or the subject of the clause in which it appears). Conversely, the presence of PRO in (19b) is required to allow coreference between the pronoun and the subject of the clause.

We will follow this idea in order to explain the contrast between the sentences in (20). In the example with a strong NP (20a), the antecedent of the anaphor can be either the subject of the embedded clause, *Pedro*, or the subject of the matrix clause, *Juan*. However in (20b), an instance of a weak NP, the anaphor *sí mismo* (*himself*) can only be bound by the subject of the embedded clause, *Pedro*.

(20) a. *Juan$_j$ dijo que Pedro$_i$ vio estas fotos de sí mismo$_{i/j}$*

"Juan said that Pedro saw these pictures of himself"

b. *Juan$_j$ dijo que Pedro$_i$ vio fotos de sí mismo$_{i/*j}$*

"Juan said that Pedro saw pictures of himself"

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[7] See Jackendoff (1972) and Minkoff (1994). These authors argue that accidental coreference in those case may be restricted by thematic properties.

Our claim is that the possibility of coreference between the anaphor and the subject of the matrix clause is due to the fact that the strong complex NP that contains the anaphor in (20a) is the domain in which the anaphor is bound. Tentatively, Binding Domain (CFC) for anaphors can be defined along the lines of the Subject Specified Condition (SSC)[8]. The presence of a Subject defines a domain D in which the anaphor must corefer with a c-commanding NP included in this domain. We will call "strong" NP to any NP that has a Subject, an element occupying the specifier position of any N-related functional category (DP, and maybe others; see Zamparelli 1996). Therefore, we assume that strong determiners either occupy this specifier position or require the appearance of an operator-like element in a specifier position. In consequence, if a NP contains a strong determiner, as in (21), the underlying structure of (20a), an implicit argument PRO is required to bind the anaphor. Thematic interpretation of noun arguments may be taken as evidence supporting this hypothesis. Note that anaphors internal to a NP can only be interpreted as Theme. However, when the sole realized argument of a noun is an R-expression or a pronoun, it can be interpreted either as a Possessor, as an Agent or as a Theme. This contrast seems to favor the idea that anaphors are bound internally to the NP by an implicit argument.

[8] See Chomsky (1973).

If this is the case, in (21) PRO serves as binder of the anaphor. In turn, PRO may corefer with either the subject of the embedded clause or the subject of the matrix clause.

(21) *Juan$_j$ dijo que Pedro$_i$ vio* [*estas PRO$_{i/j}$ fotos de sí mismo$_{i/j}$*]

"Juan said that Pedro saw these pictures of himself"

In (20b), since the NP that contains the anaphor is a weak NP, the first possible antecedent for the anaphor is the subject of the embedded clause and no violation of the SSC obtains. As a matter of fact, if the subject of the matrix clause binds the anaphor, the SSC is violated.

To sum up, we have argued that strong complex NPs constitute a Binding Domain. Therefore, an anaphor appearing within a strong complex NP requires the presence of an implicit argument PRO in order to satisfy condition-A. Control options of PRO will determine by transitivity the arguments with which the anaphor may corefer.

3.2 *Some remarks on Backward Binding in DOC*

Pesetsky (1994) gives an account of Backward Binding (BB) facts based upon the idea that constructions in (17) are derived structure and the anaphor is bound in the position where it is generated. Under this hypotheis, DOC like (18) are base generated. Therefore, there is no c-

command relation between the anaphor and the Theme argument, and hence a binding relation is not possible between them. However, this explanation has to face some problems. First, as Minkoff (1994) points out, there are instances of BB for which there are no plausible base generated form to satisfy the binding of the anaphor (22).

(22) *I put each other's crowns under the thrones of the king of France and the Queen of Holland*

Second, if there is reconstruction of the NP to its base position in (17), we expect that pronouns can act as bound variables in (23) (Barss & Lasnik, 1986). But this prediction is not borne out.

(23) **I denied his$_i$ paycheck to each worker$_i$*

Finally, if a weak NP substitutes for the strong NP that contains the anaphor, BB effects dissapear. This is an unexpected property, since weak NPs are more transparent than strong ones in regular contexts (see examples in (20)).

(24) a. *el Doctor X mostró esta foto de sí misma a María*

"Doctor X showed this picture of herself to María"

b. **el Doctor X mostró fotos de sí misma a María*

"Doctor X showed pictures of herself to María"

We claimed in the precedent section that, in cases of BB, the anaphor is bound within the NP that contains it. Therefore, BB must be reduced to accidental coreference between the antecedent of the anaphor inside NP and the Goal argument. Under this view, it is now necessary to give an account for sentences as (18a), repeated here as (24), in which BB is barred. That is, the problem for the present approach is to explain why *Paul and Mary* can not "accidentally" corefer with *each other*.

(24) **I showed each other's friends Paul and Mary*

Following Larson (1988), we are going to assume that DOCs are derived by movement as shown in section 2.2. Therefore, as proposed in (5), the NP containing the anaphor reconstructs in LF to its base position under the c-command of *Paul and Mary*. However, its referential features remain in the upper position creating an Extended Domain that contains *Paul and Mary* (25). In consequence, a violation of Condition B occurs if *Paul and Mary* are not disjoint in reference with the antecedent of the reciprocal.

(25)



Note that none of the problems that can not be explained under Pesetsky's approach arises in this hypothesis. Since reconstruction is not necessary to account for BB effects, example (22) is unproblematic. Ungrammaticality in cases like (23) follows the same reasoning than in (24): the pronoun and its antecedent are in the same Extended Domain. Finally, the asymmetry between strong and weak NPs is precisely what is expected under the view that reflexives are bound internally to the NP.

To end up, note that this analysis do not pose any problem for (17b), repeated here as (26). Since the NP constitutes a Binding Domain, the antecedent of the anaphor is free to corefer with any argument outside the NP. Problems arise solely for cases like (24) in which there has been a movement operation that has created an Extended Domain.

(26) *I showed Paul and Mary to each other's friends*

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